Abstract At an urban parrot sanctuary in the Midwestern USA, humans care for eightysome parrots from more than a dozen species. Many of these parrots have personal histories that include various forms of neglect, abuse, and abandonment. The article explores the forms of interspecies communication through which human caretakers interpret and respond to the psychic lives of these parrots-psychic lives that are marked by troubles ranging from social withdrawal to self-destructive behavior. These interspecies communications include body language, gesture, nonverbal vocalizations, and human-language phrases. While biosemiotic theory offers a provocative starting point for understanding these communications, sanctuary interactions destabilize certain semiotic distinctions, drawing attention to ambiguities between semantic and nonsemantic vocalization, vocalization and body language, informative speech and expletive, and communication and symptom. Building on ideas about metacommunication in animal play, I suggest that both psychic trouble and interactions to ease that trouble might be considered forms of biosemiotic creativity. By loosening and opening up the distinctions frequently drawn between human and other-than-human semiosis, it is possible to develop subtler accounts of the semiotic improvisations that emerge in uniquely configured multispecies communities such as the sanctuary.
Theorizations of psychic disturbance in humans have long privileged verbal communications. The mad, as Michel Foucault taught long ago, are incited to bear witness to their deviance in speech. 4 Psychotherapy often seeks to turn inchoate feelings into coherent narrative. How then is interspecies communication implicated in understanding and addressing psychic troubles in these other-than-human creatures? Following an engaged etho-ethnography similar to that proposed by Dominique Lestel, I focus in this article on the co-inventedness of parrot psychic life as it is creatively conveyed by parrots and speculatively interpreted and nurtured by sympathetic human caretakers (and an ethnographer). 5 Here, inquiry involves tapping the embodied, affective, and practical knowledge of parrot psyches that emerges through caretakers' immersion in an interspecies community. While this knowledge is partially informed by ethological and veterinary sciences, it is not constrained by them. I explore the possibilities of a biosemiotic reading of parrots' psychic troubles and caretakers' responses, considering in sequence the semiosis of vocalizations, body language, and sociality (or antisociality).
While the aim of the article is largely to generate provocative questions, in the end I suggest a provisional approach for grappling semiotically with the psychic troubles of parrots and conceivably other creatures as well.
If I were to use parrot semiosis in a kind of meaningful mimicry, as certain parrots use human language, this article might take the form of a sequence of cries, squawks, pacing, swaying from foot to foot, nibbling at my fingernails, pulling out my hair, glaring, chewing up the cited books and scattering them on the floor, making gouges in my skin, spinning, hiding under my desk, biting myself, biting bystanders, saying "Hi" to myself over and over, and occasionally coming out with remarks such as "I hate this stupid bird." It is intriguing to imagine such a presentation, but even aside from the problem of translation to the printed page, I lack the guts (a word that interestingly in American English signals a specifically animal courage). Still, it might be useful to imagine that other presentation hanging in the wings, and occasionally visualize it, as a kind of monstrous creature leaning over our shoulders, screaming, whistling little tunes, scattering its script of footprints between the lines, and otherwise saying things I do not know how to say.
I Hate This Bird
When I began fieldwork at the sanctuary, I naively thought that parrots might refer to their feelings in human speech. As it turns out, the parrots do not make statements such as "feel sad," "feel angry," or "feel afraid." That is not to say that they do not have the "capacity" to use such language. No one has attempted to induce in them the "emotional intelligence" that involves matching their affect to a fixed typology of possible emotions, as is currently done with some human preschoolers. As some ethologists and philosophers of science have suggested, questions of animal capacity are better redirected toward questions of animal potential. 6 In any case, in many human communities also, people rarely utter direct statements of feeling and are more apt to show affect in other ways. Similarly, sanctuary parrots do act in apparently sad, angry, or fearful ways. Some of those actions are vocalizations, and some of those vocalizations are verbal. In the parrot sanctuary, verbal language is one form of vocalization, which is one form of body language, which in turn is one form of biological sign, though the relation among these is not necessarily a nested hierarchy.
One of the first questions I asked the sanctuary director, Holly, and one of the longterm volunteers, Janelle, was how useful parrots' human language was for understanding how they are feeling. 7 Janelle replied that human language was a "distraction." Both agreed that reading birds' body language is far more important for understanding how they feel than listening to their human speech. Nonetheless, Holly mentioned that some parrots' human-language phrases are what she, after groping for the right word, called "repressed talk." She went on to relate that the night before, Harpo, a Moluccan cockatoo who is very bonded with her, repeated, "I hate this bird, I hate this bird, I hate this bird" in the middle of an otherwise garbled stream of speech.
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Harpo has been in the sanctuary for a few years but had never before uttered this phrase, at least not in human hearing. This was clearly a phrase that he heard from a human companion in his presanctuary life. Like many Moluccan cockatoos, he was passed from home to home as owners realized they could neither handle the decibel level of his vocalizations nor satisfy his need for company (a form of recurrent displacement that repeats a loss of flock that was usually a flaky flock in the first place).
9
When I asked whether his repetition of this phrase might tell us something about his current feelings, Janelle interjected, "It tells you something about his history." Holly cautiously added that it might also indicate something about his current feelings. Janelle speculated that Harpo can allow these phrases to surface now because he feels safer.
Later Holly told me that she thought that Harpo had internalized his owner's sentiment, and that in repeating it, he was voicing his self-hatred. (She was aware that other volunteers might disagree with her.) Harpo is only one of several birds in the sanctuary who have been known to repeat verbal abuse once directed at them. Birds that have been verbally abused, Holly said, utter similar phrases: "I hate you. Shut up. Bad bird.
Stupid fucking bird." They appear to be, in an Althusserian and Butlerian sense, captured by an interpellation, a form of hate speech that becomes a point of reference in their subjectivity. 10 Holly (who has been working at the sanctuary for more than ten years) said that such statements are inflected by intonations and bodily postures indicating anger and agitation. "It's a visceral reaction," she added. The amazons Cookie and Rascal, who were rescued from what was described to me as a "drug house," are famous around the sanctuary for uttering an almost constant stream of Spanish curses intermingled with exclamations about drugs and warnings that the cops are coming, also in Spanish. Like Harpo's self-abuse, these phrases seem to both signify a past event and convey an affective charge.
Here it may be useful to offer a brief aside about psittacine mimicry and vocal discourse. Ethological research suggests that parrots in the forest primarily mimic other conspecifics (which Holly confirmed).
11 In a detailed spectrographic study of the vocalizations of orange-fronted conures in Costa Rica, Thorsten Balsby and colleagues concluded that the parrots addressed other birds by imitating their contact calls, which are sometimes referred to as signature calls insofar as they are typically distinctive to a particular bird.
12 The conures' ability to imitate a call immediately upon hearing it allowed them to address parrots they did not already know well, which the researchers noted is an important skill in the high-turnover fission-fusion flocks that characterize the social life of these birds. The researchers also found that vocal imitation could be either affiliative or antagonistic, depending on the social situation. Vocal imitation is also essential for young parrots to learn their flock's vocal repertoires, which often include situationspecific calls in addition to contact calls.
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Among captive parrots, research suggests that use of human-language phrases is similarly specific to social circumstance. One study of an African gray found that the parrot's vocalizations, whether fragments of human speech, whistles, or imitations of hawk cries, dog barks, and ringing telephones, were strongly shaped by the social situation. When her significant human other was in the room, the parrot uttered English phrases more often, primarily phrases that referenced possible interactions with her caretaker, such as requests for food, objects, or play. The psychologists conducting the study concluded that it is possible for parrots raised with a conversational human to "use a variety of speech and nonword sounds in a deliberate, contextually relevant A sense of time has not always been granted to other-than-human animals by biosemioticians, however. Temporal awareness along with syntax are often associated with symbols (in the sense used by Charles Peirce), which are defined by their arbitrary, conventional, and nonanalogical relation to their referents. Icons and indexes, by contrast, are analogical signs that, in the case of icon, resemble their referents-like onomatopoeia or camouflage-or, in the case of index, are correlated with their referents in time and space, like an alarm call. Analogical signs are akin to Lyotard's affect phrases in that they are considered to be, as Jesper Hoffmeyer noted, "much more strongly anchored" in emotion.
32 Body language, gesture, and nonverbal vocalization, while abundant in both human and nonhuman animal life, 33 are thought by some theorists to be more iconic or indexical than symbolic when employed by nonhumans.
34
While Thomas Sebeok recognized symbol use in certain nonhumans, he also suggested that syntactical signs, including conjunctions like "and" and "but," are "absent in animal served that an index would need to be "reliably and repeatedly correlated with its object in space and time" in order for an association between sign and referent to be sustained. 37 He offered the example of a lab rat who will quickly stop pushing the button when it no longer receives the reward. But how, then, could a phrase such as "I hate this bird" be considered an indexical sign when it emerges so long after its correlated event? Such temporally charged phrases problematize any categorical distinction between zoo-indexical and homo-symbolic. 38 After conceding that chimps might sometimes be trained to use symbols, Hoffmeyer added that "in their natural state" they are "premaladapted to this kind of communication.
" 39 Yet such an argument requires once again shoring up the border between natural and cultural in a way that is scarcely accurate for the biosphere, let alone the parrot sanctuary.
To follow parrot story lines further, Holly has noticed that as birds make friends and develop more self-confidence, they spew terms of abuse less frequently and eventually stop altogether. She also knew of one human who was training her parrot to replace abuse phrases with more benign phrases. Such training might seem to undermine the idea that these phrases are meaningful. On the other hand, such training could be simultaneously unraveling both phrase and affect (or affect phrase) through a caring collaboration between human and bird, where the relationship itself is as crucial to the transformation as the positive reinforcement.
Semantics
I have more than once been told by primatology students that chimpanzee vocalizations are governed by the limbic system and are purely emotional, whereas gestural dialects-whether learned in forests, laboratories, or sanctuaries-are more akin to language and are governed by the cerebral system. This kind of neural geography seems to 35. Sebeok, Global Semiotics, 54. The claim about syntax seems related to another claim that in (human) symbolic signification, the relation of signs to objects is subordinate to the relation of signs to other signs (Kohn, How Forests Think, 53; Hoffmeyer, Biosemiotics, 288 Ingold convincingly argued that utterances derive their meaning not from attachment to concepts but from improvisational engagements with the world. 44 This understanding of vocalization helps to elucidate why the most common human-language phrase repeated by any given parrot in the sanctuary is the term of address that has been most directed to that bird. So Harpo elicits my attention with "Hi Harpo," the Goffin cockatoo Murphy with "Hi Murph," and the triton cockatoo Bobby with "Hi
Bobby." They utter these phrases not only as a greeting when they see human friends but also as a bid for interaction. "Hi Harpo" is not an address term "Hi" attached to the name of a bird. Rather, the phrase operates as a term of address that is specific to
Harpo in relation to any human with whom he chooses to interact.
If we imagine "Hi Harpo" as taking the place of a contact call in a more bird- highly anomalous as contact calls since they are used only to address the surrogate's adopted offspring. Ultimately, it seems that all these questions are still too caught up in a Saussurian search for the signified. If such terms of address substitute for the contact calls of forest-dwelling birds, then they suggest that contact calls themselves might more aptly be understood as discursive markers of a situation involving particular birds rather than as nominative labels for particular birds. That is, they might be signs of a processual separation and proposed reunion between flockmates rather than proper names of the birds themselves, identifying situations and potential interactions rather than personae.
Borrowing from Brian Massumi but without abandoning van Dooren's concern for animal biographies, the calls might be aptly thought of as "movements of expression"
constituting "subjectivity without a subject" in a story line in which the protagonist is "always surpassed in the next pulse of life." 48 After mentioning that parrots seldom mimic other species in the wild, Holly noted, "The reason they [the human-bonded birds] copy us is because we're their flock. . . . They learn sounds from the wild parrots here . . . but the reason they want to learn how to talk is because they want to fit in with us. They want to be part of their flock." 49 Address phrases such as "Hi Harpo" are not substitutes for contact calls, I suggest, but rather improvisations on contact calls that reflect the unique configurations of relationship within a particular multispecies community.
In a final twist on vocalizations, after spending a few weeks at the sanctuary I began to notice the blurring of semantic and nonsemantic vocalizations in human speech as well. Volunteers' conversation with parrots was sprinkled with expressive nonverbal syllables. Louisa would say "wheeeee" when swinging the Moluccan cockatoo
Cowboy by his feet, and Holly would say "wey, wey, wey" when bouncing a cockatoo up observant raven knew that "Roah" was a call addressed only to the raven himself and so could hardly be equivalent to Lorenz's call-note. It is more plausible that Roah, riffing off Lorenz, was using the sign improvisationally in the sense of "follow me."
46. For discussions of imprinting in birds, see Lorenz (ibid.) and down on her arm. Such phrases were also interspersed in conversations with other humans. Holly, for instance, would sometimes insert noises, like enh or errr in the midst of her speech. Over time, I was able to grasp the affective and situational meanings of some of these sounds, none of which, I venture, has a one-word equivalent in English.
Her recourse to them did not reflect any lack of facility in finding the appropriate word (she was extremely articulate) but rather a lack of capacity for English to succinctly, accurately, and vividly convey her thought and feeling. Err, for instance, seemed to voice a frustration at being compelled to accept something she would rather reject. She uttered this quasi-growl in moments of difficult interaction with birds, or once when she spoke of being forced to admit, against her rational judgment, that an animal communicator had actually given her useful information about a sanctuary parrot. On that occasion, she said, "I go, 'It's not scientific.' And then something else will come out 
Reading Gestures
One question that has perplexed scientists who have endeavored to teach animals to speak is how to know whether the animals feel what they say they feel. Alex, the 50. Despret, "Body We Care For," 125.
51. Since cockatoos are not sexually dimorphic, identifying their biological gender requires a somewhat invasive veterinary exam. Consequently, many parrots have names that invoke a gender not corroborated by biology. In Miranda's case, once his biological gender was identified, sanctuary personnel tried to change his name to Randy. They eventually gave up the attempt, since he continued to prefer Miranda and to refer to himself as "pretty girl."
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African gray who was taught human language by Irene Pepperberg, spontaneously began to say "I'm sorry, I'm sorry," when he had done something he knew would anger her (such as chewing up one of her grant applications at a time when these were still composed on typewriters).
52 But did he actually feel remorse, she wondered, or had he simply learned from her that this phrase was effective in defusing a potentially tense and conflictual situation? Following Ingold, I suggest that this formulation of the question sets up a superfluous separation between inner experience and outer presentation, a certain possibly Protestant-derived semiotic ideology in Webb Keane's terms. 53 With that understanding, we might posit remorse as an affective dimension of placation rather than a prior interior motive. It is also possible that Pepperberg's question derives from an experimental attention to verbal language that throws other forms of semiosis into the shadows.
For there is more to parrot communication than vocalizations. Parrot sounds are almost always interpreted at the sanctuary in coordination with accompanying gestures and actions. Sanctuary parrots lift their crests to convey excitement or alarm.
They dip their heads to request a neck scratch. Cowboy shakes his head vigorously while saying "no, no, no" when he does not want to do something he is asked to do.
They contract their pupils when they are angry and draw their feathers up close to their bills when content. When experienced sanctuary volunteers interpret the affective thrust of avian speech or actions, they employ a perceptual gestalt whereby they interpret intonation, volume, body language, posture, facial expression, and situation all at once. Parrots surely interpret a similar (though probably more nuanced) bodily syntax in each other and in their human companions, further challenging the idea that syntax is absent from other-than-human semiosis. Once when I was sitting with Holly in the lobby, she played with Harpo on her lap while Cowboy looked on from an overhead perch. Cowboy, she knew from previous experience, was likely to be jealous of the attention that she was giving Harpo. "He's glaring at me," Holly said. "Is that a glare?" I asked. I had not learned to read the expressions in parrots' eyes. "It's a borderline glare," she replied.
Cowboy is a self-mutilator who wears a vest to protect him from gouging his own breast. He has earned the epithet Cowboy the cockatool-maker because of the great care with which he will fashion and sharpen a splinter of wood to poke through his vest in order to reach his skin. But when the weather was warm enough, and one of his closest human friends, Louisa, put him in a harness and took him for a walk, Cowboy sat up alert on her shoulder, chattering incessantly. Never once did he worry his skin with his beak. As the wind ruffled his feathers, he was more animated than I had ever seen him. By the way he raised his head into the air and swiveled it, seeming to take in the freeway overpass, the taco truck with its milling customers, and the slanted sunlight, I surmised that he was enjoying the feeling of the wind lifting his feathers in the wounds requiring stitches on several humans, it was determined that he needed "more human interaction," and he was brought to the midwestern sanctuary. He is less aggressive now but still treated with caution by most volunteers. Bobby and Louie, another Moluccan, destroy their feathers. While feather-destruction is not understood as selfmutilation per se, it is found only in captive birds. It could signify boredom, anxiety, irritation, or an affect for which humans have no name. Biologically, feather destruction is often regarded as a "redirection" of grooming behavior.
59 Transposing the biological to the biographical, feather destruction might be understood as a (tragic) innovation in self-care.
Malachi, a Moluccan who was an even more diligent self-mutilator than Cowboy, died just a month before I began my fieldwork, as a result of his own self-injury. Holly and Janelle told me his story one afternoon while Louie hopped around us, occasionally pecking at our shoes, and Harpo climbed the bars of an empty cage nearby. Malachi's previous owner had left him at the Humane Society. For his first several years at the sanctuary, he refused to leave his cage. He would sit on a perch inside and bark like a dog or swear at himself. Eventually, however, he was referred to as a "flock leader" because of his ability to get along so well with the other birds. Even so, he never stopped self-mutilating and finally began biting his elbow, a place impossible to effectively bandage. "He got into the joint capsule," Holly said, "and once he did that-." Janelle interjected, "He knew. He knew that if he got to the joint he was going to have to be euthanized." "You think it was suicidal?" I asked. "Yeah," Janelle replied, "I think he did it on purpose," and then turning to Holly she asked, "Don't you think he did it on purpose?" Holly started to speak, then paused. "I wish he would have waited a little longer," Janelle said. "I wanted to take him outside one more time." "We had collars," Holly continued.
"But if he stretched down just far enough . . . he could dig a little bit. It was a Saturday that he did all of this work. And there was nothing-. That night we had to euthanize him." Both she and Janelle teared up then, and I did not question them further. It seemed there was no clear consensus as to whether Malachi's death was a suicide, but
Holly did not argue with Janelle's assessment. Does it matter whether Malachi was impelled by a desire for an imagined death or by an uncontrollable urge toward bodily self-harm? Lisa Stevenson noted that to treat suicide as a mental health disorder is to be caught in a peculiar paradox, insofar as "'disease' is marked here primarily by the intention to carry out a particular action rather than by an organic imbalance or deviation from a norm." 60 Suicide is simultaneously a symptom, an action, and a communication. Derrida suggested that the suffering of animals (or of humans) should be imagined not as a capacity but rather as a certain "not being able." 61 But in the face of symptoms of suffering that are also actions, this formulation seems strangely inadequate. The sanctuary parrots' distress is active, often hyperactive, even inventive: Miranda spinning, Bobby plucking his feathers, Cowboy crafting a splinter to wound himself, Malachi working his beak assiduously into his joint.
One day I was sitting on a bench in the sanctuary hallway talking with Holly.
Bobby was perched on my left forearm, carefully placing popsicle sticks that I handed him on his back, then taking them off again and throwing them on the floor. ing surrounding signals such as the snap or the bow, which work like the sign "not" to convey that "this is not a (real) bite." Bateson suggested that certain psychopathologies such as schizophrenia could be understood as a failure to register the framings that would demarcate fantasy from reality. His argument moved directly from the playful canine to the disturbed human, but the omitted possibility of a disturbed dog (or parrot) is the absent presence in his analysis. Is it not possible, moreover, that in addition to missing some metacommunications, a creature might also magnify or misinterpret others?
My jumpiness about simultaneously playing with two birds, both of whom have a reputation for being unpredictable, might have composed a metasign that complicated my apparent friendliness-a kind of "but" that was legible to Harpo through my bodily syntax. As many have pointed out, the true cleverness of Hans the horse (who initially persuaded so many humans of his mathematical prowess) was that he could so accurately read the inadvertent bodily signs of his human attendants. 63 With all the focus on human language, no research seems to have been done about psittacine potential to read human body language. In any case, Harpo's bite, like Malachi's suicide, slides between symptom, action, and communication. It can be read as a sign of fear and raging hormones 64 or a message of "get away," which is illocutionary in interrupting an interaction that had probably become borderline uncomfortable for both of us.
Speaking of symptoms that are communications or vice versa, for a while I wondered if even a parrot's repetition of his or her own name might be a form of compulsivity in which a bird is caught in a perpetual state of address-desperately seeking recognition, as if human reciprocity were always in some way insufficient. But volunteers perceive these greetings as ways of reiterating and sustaining connection or a hyphenated parrot-in-connection, a version of Deleuze and Guattari's "animal-stalks-at-fiveo'clock," which might be articulated as animal-calls-human-flockmember-by-repeatinghuman-given-name. 65 Moreover, since these are the primary human-language phrases currently addressed to these parrots, the parrots might reasonably surmise that these phrases exhaust human verbal repertoire when it comes to talking to birds.
Bird-Identified Birds
For let us not forget that we are in a city and not a forest. Given the long-term memories Cowboy, I was told, "doesn't fit into anything," and Harpo has "no clue what to do with other birds."
64. The hormone surges of male parrots in the sanctuary manifest in competitive courtship, random aggression, and unfocused "nest building" (i.e., the shredding of wood and cardboard).
65. Deleuze and Guattari, Thousand Plateaus, 290; Buchanan, 183. 66 . A study conducted at the sanctuary among umbrella cockatoos offered an elaborate typology of disturbed bird psyches, including cockatoo-normative, cockatoo-intact, cockatoo-fragile, cockatoo-disorganized, and human-intact, correlating each of these with developmental history-e.g., wild, wild-bred but captured prior to socialization, captive-bred stable, captive-bred unstable (Bradshaw, Yenkosky, and McCarthy, "Avian Affective Dysregulation").
One of the most important means of easing psychic troubles at the sanctuary is the cultivation of social relationships. Flocks are critical to parrot vitality. In general, birds value what volunteers call "ambient company." Sometimes, the volunteers said, ambient company is all a parrot wants, and more direct engagement with birds or humans is intrusive or upsetting. A desire for ambient company describes the way that Philippe likes to hang out on Karly's cage (another Moluccan), even though they never preen one another, and the way that birds who appeared to dislike Malachi when he was alive still mourned him when he died.
67 Matei Candea proposed that in theorizing intra-or interspecies relations it is crucial to consider not only "interaction" but "interpatience," forms of relationship marked by a distant tolerance that avoids face-to-face encounter. 68 Interpatience is an important form of relationship and zoopolitesse within the sanctuary. Given this comment, one might expect that the easing of distress for humanidentified birds, whom one might be tempted to diagnose with some form of dissociative disorder, 70 is not necessarily about teaching them that they are birds. Yet the sanctuary volunteers do make efforts in that direction. Philippe's greeting, addressed by humans to him and by him to humans, is not "Hi Philippe" but rather "Hi Bird." It was not until I had been working at the sanctuary for several weeks that I discovered that they had started calling him Bird as a way of reminding him that he is (or at least can become) a bird. 71 Karly, who was once beaten, probably with a baseball bat, until he became blind in one eye, never leaves the vicinity of his cage and often screams loudly for minutes on end. One day when his screams were especially deafening, I was surprised to hear Louisa comment, "Sometimes we rue the day we taught Karly to scream."
67. Sanctuary parrots manifest their mourning by going silent, losing their appetite, refusing to play, and withdrawing to their cages. 71. Implicit here is the volunteers' openness to the possibility that Philippe grasps the meaning of bird.
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"You taught him to scream?" I asked. "He was too scared to scream," Holly explained.
"He rarely would make a peep. He was beaten for making noise. So we encouraged him, any time we heard him make noise, we were like 'Yay, Karly, yay.' Now we're like 'Why did we do that to ourselves?'" But her question is both rhetorical and a joke. They did it to help Karly be more of a Moluccan, with the understanding that what that means is to nudge him along a continuum of becoming from anomalous creature toward cockatoo.
Although the sanctuary has a policy of not clipping any birds' wings, in order to make flight theoretically possible, many of the larger captive-raised birds have never learned to fly. Selected volunteers work to teach them to fly, even if only for a few feet. "It's part of trying to teach them that they're birds," Holly told me.
It helps them become more stable mentally. So we'll try as much as we can to teach everybody some basics of flying. It's hard because you have to be able to hold their feet . . . you have to be able to toss them without having them think that something horrible is happening to them. There are some that literally we are still working on that trust base with: Miranda. Gomer is actually just learning how to fly. He can go down the hallway now. Birds fly to get away from things, birds fly to get places. If they've never felt that they've had a way to escape something or get where they want to go, it generally turns into a lack of confidence, increased aggression, adds to them not really recognizing that they're a bird, helplessness, increased reliance on humans. So even if they can just realize it enough to know, "I can get from here to there without smashing my face into the ground, or . . . every time I take off isn't this horrible experience that hurts me," it really improves them overall. It actually can decrease feather-destructive behavior. It decreases aggression. There's really a marked change in them once they learn even just a short flight.
Insofar as psychic trouble involves bodily postures and movements, physically encouraging new bodily habits directly intervenes in that trouble.
One bird, who I will give the pseudonym Jody at Holly's request that he not be identified, killed another bird, Unchi, during what Holly referred to as a "psychotic break." Unchi was a wild-caught bird who often harassed human-bonded birds like Jody. It was during one such incident of harassment (which might have been prevented if the caretakers had been more attentive) that Unchi was killed. Afterward, Jody descended into what Holly called a depression that lasted eight months. That is, he grew silent, lost his appetite, became socially withdrawn, and refused to play. He seemed to be haunted by Unchi's death, but perhaps he was also haunted by Unchi's life: the possibility of being a bird who could distinguish, through metacommunications, between harassment and a fight to the death, a bird who confronted Jody with the impossible possibility of being a "birds' bird" himself.
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72. Some readers might object, as did one reviewer, that portraying Jody as haunted is excessively anthropomorphic. I suggest, however, that it is no more anthropomorphic than the idea that he is grieving. These are two differently nuanced notions for conveying how past events weigh on present psychic life. If Van Dooren has noted that conservationists engaged in captive breeding of nearextinct Hawaiian crows are guided in part by notions of authenticity, even as they acknowledge that the crows they will eventually release are "emergent forms of crow- In any case, the tale of Jody and Unchi is a reminder that psychic trouble carries a connotation of deviance as well as distress. In that light, Unchi's death raises one last question: when wild-caught birds single out and stalk human-identified birds, might they themselves be engaged in reading the signs of craziness from an avian angle?
Whatever answer one might attempt, the social and psychic wildness of the sanctuary involves improvised communications not easily classified by biosemiotic theory.
Perhaps the parrots' psychic troubles (and some human psychic troubles as well) are better understood as vitally inventive, if often tragic, responses to restriction of their social possibilities.
75 That is, their troubled actions might be a kind of inversion or nervous extension of the improvisations involved in play. "In play," Massumi observed (echoing Bateson), "the animal elevates itself to the metacommunicational level, where it gains the capacity to mobilize the possible. Its powers of abstraction rise a notch." 76 I speculate that the "wild" psychic troubles in the parrot sanctuary arise not only, as Bateson might have it, from missing a metacommunicative frame, as in Harpo's reaction to the grieving appears less anthropomorphic, it may be because it can be placed in a scientific (specifically psychological) register subject to scientific evidence, whereas haunting belongs to an uncanny or poetic register, subject only to phantasmal evidence. Restricting nonhuman affect to scientific rather than uncanny registers seems yet another way to presume the relative poverty of nonhuman worlds. While we may not know birds' phantoms, it is not outlandish to speculate that they exist. See Langford, "Toward a Hauntology of the Other-than-Human." passing car's subwoofer, but from mistaking or reimagining the frame through biosemiotic processes that, like play, involve powers of abstraction and innovation. The personal histories of these captive parrots have eroded or obviated expected framings for parrot lifeways. Vocalization has been disconnected from the frame of a supportive flock. Preening has been unmoored from the frame of self-care associated with flight.
Biting has been detached from the frame of play with trusted friends. As I intimated earlier, biting might be viewed as a reimagining of play as aggression, feather plucking as a reimagining of self-care as self-destruction, and abusive speech or self-isolation as a reimagining of sociality as antisociality. Such troubles can sometimes be eased through interspecies interaction that is as inventive as the psychic disturbances themselves, inviting parrots to reimagine their lives once again. 
